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Abstract
According to IFRS 7, banks have to disclose the inputs used in measuring the fair value
of nancial instruments. For this purpose the standard denes a three-level measurement
hierarchy. The reliability of fair values is expected to decrease with decreasing hierarchy
level due to the lower quality of the input factors. Using a value relevance research setting, I
nd that investors perceive the reliability of level 3 fair values as signicantly lower than the
reliability of level 1 fair values. However, in contrast to expectations, level 2 fair values are
not perceived as less reliable. Thus, investors only doubt the reliability of fair values whose
inputs are based on discretionary assumptions. Additionally, this paper analyses the impact
of the reclassication of nancial assets and of the regulatory capital ratio on the reliability
of fair values. While I nd a weakly signicant impact of the regulatory capital ratio, the
reclassication has in general no inuence on the reliability of reported fair values.
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1 Introduction
Fair value accounting has been one of the most controversial issues in nancial reporting over
the last 20 years. Proponents argue that full fair value accounting (FFVA) improves market
discipline and reveals risks from maturity transformation and changes in credit risks earlier
than historic cost accounting. Thus, it can reduce the procyclicality of the nancial system.
Opponents, on the other hand, argue that FFVA increases earnings and equity volatility, reduces
the resilience of nancial institutions against nancial shocks, and lacks reliability when markets
are inactive and valuation models have to be used to measure fair values (e.g. Enria et al. (2004)).
Nevertheless, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) continually expanded the
application of fair values in IFRS.1
During the nancial crisis, the debate about fair value accounting, especially for nancial in-
struments, gained momentum (see for a broad discussion Laux and Leuz (2009)). Fair value
accounting was again criticized for being unreliable. The reliability of fair values has been widely
discussed before in the value relevance research (e.g. Barth (1994), Barth et al. (1996), Nelson
(1996)). This research can be seen as an instrument to operationalize IASBs most important
qualitative characteristics of decision useful accounting information, relevance and reliability
(Barth et al. (2001)).2 While fair values undoubtedly possess relevance for economic decision
making, a lack of reliability can diminish the value relevance of fair values signicantly. A
vast majority of value relevance studies nds evidence that fair values are overall value relevant
and have incremental explanatory power in comparison to historic cost measures. Nonetheless,
several studies show that fair values of illiquid nancial instruments are signicantly less value
relevant than fair values of liquid nancial instruments (e.g. Petroni and Wahlen (1995), Ec-
cher et al. (1996)). Accordingly, illiquid nancial instruments are perceived as less reliable by
investors. Since market illiquidity was one of the major problems during the subprime crisis,
this supports the current criticism of fair value accounting for nancial instruments.
1 Some observes even supposed that the IASB was following a hidden agenda to introduce FFVA. See e.g.
Whittington (2008).
2 In the new Conceptual Framework the IASB replaces reliability by faithful representation. However, Barth
(2007) argues that the new term is just a more accurate specication of reliability. Hence, I will use the term
reliability instead of faithful representation throughout this paper.
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The IASB reacted to the reliability issue and increased the disclosure requirements concerning
the fair value measurement of nancial instruments by amending IFRS 7 Financial Instruments:
Disclosures. Entities applying IFRS now have to disclose nancial instruments measured at
fair value by using a three-level hierarchy. The levels of this fair value hierarchy are based on
the quality of the input factors used in the measurement process. Level 1 inputs are quoted
prices in active markets, level 2 inputs include all observable data other than quoted prices, and
level 3 inputs comprise all non-observable data. This fair value hierarchy is equivalent to the
hierarchy of SFAS 157 (now Topic 820), albeit limited to nancial instruments, and anticipates
the disclosure requirements established in IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement. Any measurement
based on inputs of the rst level of this hierarchy is also labelled as mark-to-market, while fair
value measurement based on inputs of lower levels is called mark-to-model, which Warren Bu¤ett
famously denounced as mark-to-myth (Bu¤ett (2003)). Even though he said that mark-to-model
only in rare cases declines to a mark-to-myth, it can clearly be stated that the reliability of fair
values is decreasing with a decreasing measurement level. The reduced reliability of level 2 and
level 3 fair values arises from two factors. First, model-based fair values can be biased due to
unintentional measurement errors. Second, management can deliberately use discretion in fair
value measurement for earnings management. Thus, fair values based on mark-to-model might
be noisy measures of the truevalue. Goh et al. (2009), Kolev (2008), and Song et al. (2010)
investigate the value relevance of this fair value hierarchy for the U.S. market. They show that
fair values of all hierarchy levels are value relevant. However, as expected, fair values based on
level 2 or 3 inputs are signicantly less value relevant than fair values based on quoted prices.
Another concern about fair value accounting for nancial instruments was its procyclical e¤ect
on the nancial sector. This e¤ect occurs when banks adjust their balance sheet structures
following asset price changes (e.g. Plantin et al. (2008)). If prices of assets which are marked
to market decrease, leverage ratios increase, and regulatory capital requirements can necessitate
banks to sell assets to reduce their leverage. These asset sales might further depress asset
prices. Therefore, European politicians pressed the IASB during the nancial crisis to relax fair
value accounting for nancial instruments by allowing banks to reclassify their nancial assets
measured at fair value to categories which require amortized cost measurement. The IASB
conceded and created new reclassication options by amending IAS 39 Financial Instruments:
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Recognition and Measurement. Studies of Bischof et al. (2010) and Kholmy and Ernstberger
(2010) analyze which intentions banks pursued by reclassifying nancial assets. Bischof et al.
(2010) nd that banks reclassied nancial assets to avoid a violation of regulatory capital
requirements. Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010) analyze additionally whether protability might
have had an impact on reclassication decisions. The authors conclude that banks use the new
reclassication options for general earnings management.
This study focusses on the rst concern about fair values, i.e. the lack of reliability. Therefore,
the fair value hierarchy for nancial instruments is examined in a value relevance research setting
similar to Song et al. (2010). However, it extends the existing literature (Goh et al. (2009), Kolev
(2008), Song et al. (2010)) by analyzing, for the rst time, the value relevance and the reliability
of the IFRS 7 fair value hierarchy based on the nancial data of European banks. Furthermore,
this study covers a longer time period than prior studies. While Goh et al. (2009), Kolev (2008),
and Song et al. (2010) focus on data from 2008, I use nancial data from 2006 to 2010. The
results show that fair values of all measurement levels are value relevant. Further, level 3 fair
values are signicantly less reliable than level 1 or level 2 fair values. In a next step, the study
analyzes the impact of regulatory capital and of reclassication decisions on the reliability of
mark-to-model fair values. In contrast to the results of Goh et al. (2009), it can be shown that
the regulatory capital ratio has no signicant inuence on the reliability of level 3 fair values.
Additionally, notwithstanding the results of Bischof et al. (2010) and Kholmy and Ernstberger
(2010) that banks use the new reclassication option for earnings management and to avoid
violating regulatory requirements, capital markets do not perceive mark-to-model fair values of
reclassifying banks as less reliable than fair values of non-reclassifying banks.
In the next Section the institutional background, i.e. the relevant accounting standards, is
discussed. Section 3 summarizes the related literature and discusses the contribution of this
study. Section 4 contains the empirical investigation, including sample selection, hypotheses
development, empirical modelling, and results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Institutional Background
I will refer to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 throughout this study without considering IFRS 9 and IFRS
13. IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement, which were issued in
2009 and 2011 respectively, have amended both IAS 39 and IFRS 7. While IFRS 13 was not
applicable during the sample period, the IASB would have allowed an early voluntary application
of IFRS 9 starting with November 2009. However, the European Commission has not endorsed
the new standard until today. Therefore, the sample banks could not apply the new accounting
standards during the sample period.
2.1 IFRS 7 - Fair Value Hierarchy
IAS 39.9 denes fair value as the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liabil-
ity settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arms length transaction.From this
denition follows that the fair value is a measure which is closely related to the market value.
Yet, it cannot be assumed that fair and market values are identical in all cases, because fair
values can be based on valuation models. IAS 39 denes a hierarchy for the measurement of fair
values of nancial instruments. The quoted market price of a nancial instrument is always the
best estimate for the fair value if an active market exists. However, if there is no active market,
entities have to use established valuation approaches to measure the fair value of a nancial
instrument. In this case, the reliability of the fair value deteriorates because of two reasons.
First, the model-based valuation might include an undeliberate measurement error. Second,
entities could use the discretion in valuation models to manage earnings. Hence, mark-to-model
fair values might be noisy measures of the truevalues. For nancial markets it is thus vital to
get information about the fair value hierarchy because accounting information has to be both
relevant and reliable to be useful for decision making. While markets usually do not doubt the
relevance of fair values for the decision making process, the reliability of fair values became more
important at the climax of the last nancial crisis. Although IFRS 7 required some disclosures
regarding the measurement of fair values prior to 2009, entities did not have to disclose sep-
arately which amount of nancial instruments measured at fair value was based on valuation
models.
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Eventually, the IASB reacted to the information needs of capital market participants and
amended IFRS 7 in March 2009 (IASB (2009)). This amendment implemented an input-based
measurement hierarchy for nancial instruments (IFRS 7.27A). There are three levels of inputs:
 Level 1: Quoted market prices of identical nancial instruments.
 Level 2: Inputs based on observable market data.
 Level 3: Inputs not based on observable market data.
Entities have to classify their nancial instruments measured at fair values according to this input
hierarchy. The level of a fair value is determined by the lowest level of signicant inputs used in
the valuation process. The amendment does not only dene this fair value hierarchy but adds
several quantitative disclosure requirements regarding the fair value measurement (IFRS 7.27B).
For example, entities have to disclose signicant transfers between di¤erent measurement levels
and a reconciliation from the opening balance to the closing balance for level 3 fair values. But
most important for this study, entities have to make quantitative disclosures regarding the fair
values measured at the di¤erent levels of the fair value hierarchy.
When it adopted this fair value hierarchy for nancial instruments, the IASB clearly followed
SFAS 157 (now Topic 820) and anticipated the results of the Fair Value Measurement Project
(IFRS 13). However, this newmeasurement hierarchy can rather be seen as a further speci-
cation of the hierarchy dened in IAS 39 and, accordingly, fair values based on level 2 and 3
inputs should su¤er from a reduced reliability.
2.2 IAS 39 - Reclassication of Financial Instruments
The second major issue regarding fair value accounting during the nancial crisis was the reclas-
sication of nancial instruments. Generally, in IFRS, similar to US-GAAP, the measurement of
nancial instruments is determined by a classication of these instruments at initial recognition
in one of ve categories. While the categories at fair value through prot or loss(AFV) and
available for sale(AFS) require a measurement at fair value, the categories held to maturity
(HTM), loans and receivables(LAR), and other liabilities(OL) demand a measurement at
amortized costs. Prior to the amendment to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 from October 2008 (IASB
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(2008)), the reclassication options were very limited. An entity could only reclassify nancial
instruments, without facing sanctions, from the category AFS to the category HTM. In addition,
entities could reclassify nancial instruments from the category HTM to the category AFS, but
would face sanctions if reclassifying more than an insignicant amount. The IASBs intention
behind these very limited reclassication options was to restrain earnings management. Politi-
cians however, concerned about the procyclical e¤ect of fair value accounting, at the climax of
the nancial crisis pressed the IASB to relax reclassication rules. The EU Commission even
threatened the IASB with another carve-out from IAS 39 that would allow European rms to
reclassify nancial instruments (McCreevy (2008)). Eventually, the IASB conceded to the po-
litical pressure and amended IAS 39 and IFRS 7, primarily to avoid new reclassication options
without accompanying disclosure requirements (Bischof et al. (2010)). The amendment did not
follow the IASBs due process for standard-setting, went e¤ective retroactively in July 2008 and
had no impact on the existing reclassication options. Thus, it can clearly be identied as an
emergency measure.
The new reclassication rules allow entities to reclassify nancial assets from the trading to
the banking book, i.e. from categories which require measurement at fair value to categories
which require measurement at amortized costs (IAS 39.50-50F). More precisely, entities can now
reclassify nancial assets held for trading into the categories AFS, HTM and LAR and nancial
assets available for sale into the category LAR. However, entities are not allowed to reclassify
nancial derivatives and nancial instruments which were designated at initial recognition as
AFV. Furthermore, nancial assets can only be reclassied from AFV into AFS or HTM in rare
circumstances. The denition of a rare circumstance is, however, somewhat imprecise. The
IASB assumes that it is due to a single event that is unusual and highly unlikely to recur in the
near term(IAS 39.BC104D). Therefore, the identication of such a market condition might be
open for dispute.
As mentioned before, the IASB conceded to the political pressure because it wanted to avoid
new reclassication options without accompanying disclosures. Therefore, the IASB did not
only amend IAS 39 in October 2008 but also IFRS 7. According to this amendment, entities
are obliged to follow extensive disclosure requirements regarding reclassied nancial assets
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(IFRS 7.12A). For example, entities have to disclose reclassied amounts, involved categories,
carrying amounts, and fair values of nancial assets which were reclassied in current or previous
reporting periods. Furthermore, entities have to disclose the facts that might indicate that a
rare circumstance is existent.
Overall, the new reclassication rules draw criticism. First, the standard-setting process was
the result of a severe interference in the independence of the standard-setting body. Second
and most important, the relaxed reclassication rules open up new possibilities for earnings
management. Hence, the amendment from October 2008 had most likely a negative e¤ect on
the overall accounting quality of IFRS.
3 Related Literature
This study is based on the vast body of value relevance literature on fair value accounting for
nancial instruments. These studies generally nd, beginning with Barth (1994), that disclosed
(e.g. Ahmed and Takeda (1995), Eccher et al. (1996), Simko (1999)) as well as recognized (e.g.
Park et al. (1999), Carroll et al. (2003), Ahmed et al. (2006)) fair values are value relevant and
provide investors with incremental information in comparison to historic cost measures. Several
studies, however, cast doubt to the value relevance of illiquid nancial instruments (Petroni
and Wahlen (1995), Eccher et al. (1996)). The results of these studies indicate that market
participants perceive the reliability of illiquid nancial instruments as substantially deteriorated.
This might be due to the fact that entities have to use valuation models to estimate the fair values
of these instruments. Hence, the fair values might be only, as argued before, noisy measures of the
truevalues. Nevertheless, Carroll et al. (2003) nd for their sample of closed-end investment
funds that investors do not value fair values of liquid and illiquid nancial assets di¤erently.
This striking result could be explained by private information an entity can provide by using
valuation models. Some evidence for such an e¤ect of private information is provided by Beaver
and Venkatachalam (2003). They split loan fair values into discretionary, non-discretionary, and
noise components and show that the discretionary component is priced higher by investors than
its balance sheet value indicates. The positive e¤ect of discretion on the relevance of accounting
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information might thus outweigh its negative e¤ect on reliability. Summing up the evidence, it
is not obvious whether the value relevance of model-based fair values is signicantly reduced.
More recent studies have focused on the reliability of fair values of nancial instruments during
the last nancial crisis. While Kolev (2008), Goh et al. (2009), and Song et al. (2010) analyze
the value relevance of the SFAS 157 fair value hierarchy in 2008, Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas
(2011) lay their focus on the value relevance of nancial instruments of IFRS-adopting banks for
the period from 2006 to 2008. Kolev (2008), Goh et al. (2009), and Song et al. (2010) nd that
fair values of all measurement levels are value relevant. However, they also show consistently
that level 3 fair values have signicantly reduced valuation coe¢ cients. Goh et al. (2009) even
nd evidence that investors perceive level 2 fair values as signicantly less value relevant than
level 1 fair values. Overall, these ndings indicate that the reduced reliability of mark-to-model
fair values outweighs any positive e¤ect of private information on the relevance of fair values.
The results of Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2011) support this notion. They analyze fair values
of IFRS-adopting banks, but do not use fair value hierarchy disclosures because they were not
obligatory in IFRS until 2009. Instead, they use fair values of nancial instruments held for
trading and of nancial instruments which were designated at initial recognition at fair value
through prot or loss. They assume that designated nancial instruments are less reliable
because it is a discretionary decision to measure them at fair value and banks can use this
discretion for earnings management. The authors show that investors, indeed, perceive these
fair values as less value relevant than the fair values of nancial instruments held for trading.
Yet the theoretical foundation of this study is disputable because the discretion in designating
nancial instruments at fair value is very limited (IAS 39.9b, IAS 39.12A) and the designation
is an irrevocable decision.
Additionally, the studies show that the value relevance of mark-to-model fair values is less
reduced for banks with better corporate governance (Song et al. (2010)), big-4 auditors, and
high regulatory capital (Goh et al. (2009)). Thus, capital markets discount mark-to-model fair
values of banks with lower incentives for earnings management less.
Overall, the recent evidence supports the hypothesis that mark-to-model fair values are less
reliable than mark-to-market fair values. Nevertheless, there are several limitations to this
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conclusion. First, the studies focus on the subprime crisis in 2008 and do not cover the post-
crisis period. Hence, the perception of the reliability of mark-to-model fair values could have
changed in 2009 or 2010. Second, Kolev (2008), Goh et al. (2009), and Song et al. (2010) analyze
the fair value hierarchy only for U.S. banks. Third, the study of Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas
(2011), which indeed focuses on fair value accounting in European banks, does not analyze the
fair value hierarchy and lacks a convincing theoretical foundation. Accordingly, there is currently
no study analyzing the value relevance of the IFRS 7 fair value hierarchy. This study is aimed
to mitigate these limitations by analyzing the IFRS 7 fair value hierarchy for European banks
from 2006 to 2010.
Another string of research this study picks up, is the accounting choice literature. This litera-
ture provides essential inputs for the question which intentions banks pursued by using the new
reclassication options. The studies show that banks used the relaxed rules to avoid violating
regulatory capital requirements (Bischof et al. (2010)) and, in very general terms, for earnings
management (Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010)). Therefore, one would expect an overall dete-
riorated accounting quality for reclassifying banks. This study will investigate whether this is
also reected in the value relevance of mark-to-model fair values. In this context, I also exam-
ine whether capital markets price the di¤erence between the fair value and the book value of
reclassied nancial assets.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Although both IAS 39 and IFRS 7 are not industry-specic standards, this paper focuses on the
banking sector. This is due to the fact that the largest part of banksbalance sheets consists of
nancial instruments, while they usually only represent marginal positions in other industries.3
I limit the sample to European banks, i.e. banks from EU 27 and EFTA states, for a sample
period from 2006 to 2010. As mentioned before, quantitative fair value disclosures only became
3 With the notable exception of Simko (1999), all value relevance studies on fair value accounting for nancial
instruments focus on the nancial sector.
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obligatory in 2009. However, there were banks which already started to disclosure fair value
hierarchy information in 2006. While one can easily argue that banks which made fair value
hierarchy disclosures in 2008 were early adopters of the IFRS 7 amendment, the case of banks
disclosing fair value hierarchy information in 2006 and 2007 is more di¢ cult because there was
not even an IASB discussion paper. The early quantitative disclosures could have been caused
by a US-GAAP orientation of the disclosing banks, where SFAS 157 was issued in October 2006.
An example supporting this hypothesis is Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank adopted US-GAAP
in 2001, but had to apply IFRS in accordance with EU law (European Union (2002)) since 2007.
In its annual report from 2007 Deutsche Bank makes quantitative disclosures, but states that it
is following the IFRS fair value hierarchy (Deutsche Bank (2007), pp. 158-159). Thus, the bank
might have used SFAS 157 to interpret the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7.
I include all publicly traded European banks which are either listed in Bureau von Dijk Bankscope
or Thomson Reuters Datastream. From these I exclude all non-IFRS banks and banks without
readily available reports. The latter step is necessary because both databases do not include any
information regarding the fair value hierarchy or the reclassication of nancial assets. Thus,
my sample is essentially hand-collected. In a further step, all banks with scal-year end other
than 31st December are excluded from the sample to avoid confounding economic e¤ects in the
empirical analysis. Subsequently, bank-years without quantitative hierarchy disclosures are ex-
cluded. Most of these excluded bank-years are obviously in 2006, 2007, and 2008 (see Table 1).
Quite remarkably, even in 2009 and 2010 some banks did not make the required fair value hier-
archy disclosures. For example, OTP Banka Slovensko does not make such disclosures in 2009
(OTP Banka Slovensko (2009)). Other previous studies found similar or even more appalling ev-
idence regarding the non-compliance with obligatory disclosure requirements (e.g. Bischof et al.
(2010)). Finally, I exclude all banks without su¢ cient data on the market capitalization and
outliers. Because the sample size is rather limited, I do not use quantitative methods to exclude
or to correct for outliers but I select them manually. Three banks with overall six bank-years are
excluded from the nal sample, Crédit Industriel et Commercial, Dexia Banka Slovensko, and
Tatra Banka Slovensko. Both Dexia Banka Slovensko and Tatra Banka Slovensko have several
tranches of stocks of which some are highly illiquid. Therefore, it is impossible to calculate an
accurate rm value. Crédit Industriel et Commercial, on the other hand, has a per stock book
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value of assets that deviates substantially from the median value of the total sample4 which
could bias the empirical results. The remaining sample consists of 408 bank-years, 85.8% of
them in 2009 and 2010.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of this bank sample. Panel A provides absolute values,
Panel B relative values, i.e. values compared to total assets, and Panel C values per share. Panel
B reveals that fair value positions, in contrast to their prominence in the public debate during
the nancial crisis, only comprise a relatively small part of the balance sheet. On average, fair
value assets account for 26.1% of total assets, while fair value liabilities account only for 11.2%.
The median values are even lower. While the median value of fair value assets is 14.9%, it is just
1.5% for fair value liabilities. The largest part of nancial assets (liabilities) measured at fair
value are based on level 1 (level 2) inputs. Though, the lower relevance of fair value accounting
for nancial liabilities does not come unexpected with regard to the restrictive fair value option
of IAS 39. The low amount of nancial liabilities measured at fair value and the signicant
number of banks which do not recognize any liabilities at fair values might, however, impair the
signicance of the results of further statistical analysis.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Another important observation is that for Panel A as well as for Panel C the mean values are
substantially higher than the median values. Hence, the absolute values and the values per
share have a highly right skewed distribution. While one expects a substantial impact of large
observations in Panel A, the skewed distribution in Panel C is more critical. The number of
outstanding shares is often used in market-based accounting research as a deator to mitigate
scale e¤ects, i.e. the undue inuence of large observations on regression results. However, the
descriptives indicate that the number of outstanding shares might only replace one scaling factor
4 The deviation is higher than ten times the standard deviation.
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(market value of equity) by another (price per share). This problem will be discussed in more
detail in the robustness checks.
4.2 Hypotheses Development
The value relevance research design is a means to operationalize the trade-o¤ between relevance
and reliability which is inherent in every accounting information (Barth (2000), pp. 16-17).
Therefore, if an accounting information is value relevant, i.e. the regression coe¢ cient is signif-
icantly di¤erent from zero, its relevance at least outweighs any lack of reliability. One can also
state that accounting information is more relevant for equity investors if it is forward-looking.
However, any forward-looking accounting information can be biased by measurement error or
deliberate manipulation and thus lacks reliability. An example for forward-looking information
are fair values because they generally represent present values of expected future cash ows.
Accordingly, they are highly relevant for investors, but might lack reliability. However, it seems
to be unlikely that investors do not price fair values at all and therefore I expect the relevance
of fair values of nancial instruments to outweigh any lack of reliability, even for mark-to-model
fair values.
 H1a: Fair value assets and liabilities of all hierarchy levels are value relevant.
It is reasonable to expect the value relevance of fair value assets to decrease with decreasing
hierarchy level, because the reliability declines with decreasing level. The e¤ect is more di¢ cult
to predict for nancial liabilities. Basically, the coe¢ cients on fair value liabilities should increase
with decreasing hierarchy level because banks might use their discretion to recognize lower values
and thus show higher prots. On the other hand, measurement errors and the overall very low
relative amounts of fair value liabilities might add a signicant noise component to the estimated
coe¢ cients. Hence, I do not include fair value liabilities in H1b.
 H1b: The value relevance of fair value assets decreases with decreasing hierarchy level.
As mentioned before, the accounting choice literature on the relaxed reclassication option nds
evidence that banks use the option to manage earnings and to avoid violating regulatory cap-
ital requirements (Bischof et al. (2010), Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010)). Hence, reclassifying
4.2 Hypotheses Development 14
banks are likely to being perceived by capital market participants as less committed to a high
accounting quality because these banks have shown their willingness to actively manage earnings
and balance sheet relations, i.e. the decision to reclassify will be interpreted as a signal of low
accounting quality. This negative signal also casts doubt on the reliability of mark-to-model fair
values because banks which have used the reclassication option for earnings management are
more likely to use their discretion in measuring fair values for the same purpose. Therefore, I
expect the value relevance of mark-to-model fair values to be signicantly lower for reclassifying
banks than for non-reclassifying banks.
 H2a: The value relevance of level 2 and 3 fair value assets is lower for reclassifying banks
than for non-reclassifying banks.
The early literature on the value relevance of fair values of nancial instruments essentially
investigates whether disclosed fair values can provide incremental information to recognized
historic costs. Most of these studies nd supporting evidence (e.g. Barth et al. (1996), Eccher
et al. (1996)). I expand the basic idea of this research to the reclassication of nancial assets.
While banks recognize their reclassied assets at amortized costs, they still have to disclose the
fair values of these assets. If one assumes that banks use the reclassication option to manage
earnings and not to faithfully report their nancial position, investors should price the fair value
information disclosed in the notes. Therefore, the di¤erence between disclosed fair values and
recognized amortized costs should be value relevant and explain cross-sectional variations of
share prices.
 H2b: The di¤erence between fair values and book values of reclassied nancial assets can
explain cross-sectional and time-series variations of share prices.
The third and last hypothesis regards the nancial position of the sample banks. As a proxy
for the nancial position I use the Tier 1 capital ratio. I assume that banks with lower Tier 1
capital, i.e. banks in a poor nancial position, have higher incentives to use discretion to manage
earnings and balance sheet relations. Consequently, similar to H2a, mark-to-model fair values
of banks with low Tier 1 capital ratios should have a reduced value relevance.
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 H3: The value relevance of level 2 and 3 fair value assets is lower for banks with low Tier
1 capital ratio than for banks with high Tier 1 capital ratios.
It must be stated that the Tier 1 capital ratio might be a noisy proxy for the nancial position
of a bank. Solvent and protable banks could intentionally hold less equity capital in order to
increase their return on equity, while banks which have su¤ered a severe deterioration of the
credit quality of their loan portfolios might still show a high Tier 1 capital ratio because the
Tier 1 capital does not reect this deterioration immediately due to the incurred loss model for
nancial assets recognized at amortized costs. Furthermore, H2a and H3 are likely to overlap
at least to some extent because banks with low Tier 1 capital ratios are more likely to reclassify
nancial assets.
4.3 Empirical Model
Market-based accounting research is based on di¤erent valuation models. The most common
models are the balance sheet approach and the residual income approach. The balance sheet
approach was introduced to the value relevance literature by Landsman (1986). This approach
uses the balance sheet identity, i.e.
BVE 
mX
i=1
BVAi  
nX
j=1
BVLj ; (1)
where BVE, BVA, and BVL are the book values of equity, assets, and liabilities. The corre-
sponding valuation model assumes that the market value of equity (MVE ) is solely determined
by the market value of balance sheet assets (MVA) and liabilities (MVL):
MVE =
mX
i=1
MVAi  
nX
j=1
MVLj : (2)
Although this valuation approach seems to be very appealing because of its simplicity, the
empirical implementation reveals several weaknesses. First, not all assets and liabilities are
measured at fair value. Hence, the book value is, in general, a very noisy proxy for the market
value. Second, not all items satisfy the recognition criteria of the IASB Framework. Any
empirical implementation of this valuation model will thus rely on accounting information, which
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does neither represent all assets and liabilities of a company nor in any case market values. Thus,
in the absence of perfect markets, a valuation model that is solely based on balance sheet data
might not be descriptive. Therefore, when implementing this approach, it is common practice
to include a proxy for non-recognized assets, which is typically net income (NI ) (Barth and
Landsman (1995), Aboody et al. (1999)).
An alternative valuation approach is the Ohlson (1995) residual income valuation model. It
explicitly models information dynamics, i.e. the time-series behavior of residual income:
MVEt = BVEt + 1RIt + 2t; (3)
where RI is residual income,  captures other (non-accounting) information, and 1 and 2
are valuation coe¢ cients dependent on interest rates and information dynamics. The main
advantages of this valuation model in comparison to the balance sheet approach are the strong
theoretical foundation and the allowance for other information. However, there does not yet
seem to be a conclusive empirical measure for other information. While some studies explicitly
assume that other information is represented in the error term (e.g. Barth and Clinch (1998)),
other studies make the same assumption implicitly (e.g. Song et al. (2010)), even though this
limits the Ohlson (1995) model substantially (Liu and Ohlson (2000)). In the end, the empirical
implementation of both valuation approaches does not di¤er signicantly. Some studies even
state explicitly that their empirical model can be seen as based either on the balance sheet
approach or on the Ohlson (1995) model (e.g. Aboody et al. (1999), Barth et al. (1998)).
Following Song et al. (2010), I use a regression model which can be regarded as based on either
a modied Ohlson (1995) model or the balance sheet approach:5
Pit = 0 + 1NFVAit + 2NFVLit + 3FVA1it + 4FVA2it + 5FVA3it
+ 6FVL1it + 7FVL2it + 8FVL3it + 9NIit + "it (4)
where P is the price per share three months after scal-year end, NFVA (NFVL) are non-
fair value assets (liabilities), and FVA1 (FVL1 ), FVA2 (FVL2 ), and FVA3 (FVL3 ) are fair
5 Song et al. (2010), however, argue that their regressions are based on a modied Ohlson (1995) model.
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value assets (liabilities) of the three IFRS 7 measurement levels. The study uses the number of
outstanding shares as a deator to mitigate scale e¤ects (Barth and Clinch (2009)). Hence, all
variables are on a per share basis. Another factor that has to be considered are possible cross-
sectional (time xed e¤ects) and time-series dependencies (rm xed e¤ects) of the regression
residuals. Following Petersen (2009), I use clustered standard errors to control for xed e¤ects.
In order to test H2a, the variable ReclassAssets is included in the regression model. ReclassAssets
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bank has reclassied nancial assets on
its balance sheet and zero otherwise. The variable is interacted with fair value assets of all
measurement levels. I do not interact it with fair value liabilities because these in general
account for only a very low percentage of total assets, and a substantial number of banks does
not report any liabilities at fair value.
Pit = 0 + 1NFVA+ 2NFVLit + 3FVA1it + 4FVA1it ReclassAssetsit
+ 5FVA2it + 6FVA2it ReclassAssetsit + 7FVA3it + 8FVA3it
ReclassAssetsit + 9FVL1it + 10FVL2it + 11FVL3it + 12NIit
+ 13ReclassAssetsit + "it (5)
In addition, I expand Equation 5 by including the variable ReclassAssetsFVBV which is the
di¤erence between disclosed fair values and recognized amortized costs of assets which were
reclassied in accordance with the relaxed reclassication option.
Pit = 0 + 1NFVA+ 2NFVLit + 3FVA1it + 4FVA1it ReclassAssetsit
+ 5FVA2it + 6FVA2it ReclassAssetsit + 7FVA3it + 8FVA3it
ReclassAssetsit + 9FVL1it + 10FVL2it + 11FVL3it + 12NIit
+ 13ReclassAssetsFVBVit + 14ReclassAssetsit + "it (6)
For the third hypothesis, the variable ReclassAssets is replaced by the variable LowTier1Ratio.
This variable is another dummy which is one for all banks with a Tier 1 capital ratio below the
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median Tier 1 capital ratio and zero otherwise. Again, the dummy is interacted with fair value
assets but not with fair value liabilities.
Pit = 0 + 1NFVA+ 2NFVLit + 3FVA1it + 4FVA1it  LowTier1Ratioit
+ 5FVA2it + 6FVA2it  LowTier1Ratioit + 7FVA3it + 8FVA3it
 LowTier1Ratioit + 9FVL1it + 10FVL2it + 11FVL3it + 12NIit
+ 13LowTier1Ratioit + "it (7)
In the nal model, I combine Equations 5 and 7, i.e. I include both dummy variables in order to
control for confounding e¤ects. Confounding e¤ects might occur in Equations 5 and 7 because
banks use, as Bischof et al. (2010) show, new reclassication options to avoid violating regulatory
capital requirements. Accordingly, these banks most likely have less regulatory capital than the
median bank. Signicant results in Equation 5 might therefore be solely driven by the e¤ect of
low capital ratios and not by the e¤ects of a reclassication decision on the perceived accounting
quality.
Pit = 0 + 1NFVA+ 2NFVLit + 3FVA1it + 4FVA1it ReclassAssetsit
+ 5FVA1it  LowTier1Ratioit + 6FVA1it ReclassAssetsit  LowTier1Ratioit
+ 7FVA2it + 8FVA2it ReclassAssetsit + 9FVA2it  LowTier1Ratioit
+ 10FVA2it ReclassAssetsit  LowTier1Ratioit + 11FVA3it + 12FVA3it
ReclassAssetsit + 13FVA3it  LowTier1Ratioit + 14FVA3it ReclassAssetsit
 LowTier1Ratioit + 15FVL1it + 16FVL2it + 17FVL3it + 18NIit
+ 19ReclassAssetsit + 20LowTier1Ratioit + 21ReclassAssetsit
 LowTier1Ratioit + "it (8)
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4.4 Results
Table 3 shows the results of the basic OLS regression model (Equation 4). These results show
that all fair value assets and liabilities, even level 3 fair values, are value relevant, i.e. their
coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from zero. Hence, the evidence supports H1a. Furthermore,
when comparing the coe¢ cients of the di¤erent fair value levels, it can be seen that only the
coe¢ cients of level 3 fair values are signicantly di¤erent from the coe¢ cients of other levels.
This is true both for assets and liabilities. Accordingly, only level 3 fair values are perceived
by capital markets as less reliable than level 1 fair values. One can thus not assert that every
mark-to-model is some kind of mark-to-myth because investors distinguish between level 2 and
level 3 fair values and even price the least reliable fair values. The fact that the coe¢ cients of
fair value liabilities decrease with decreasing hierarchy level is somewhat striking. Following the
consideration that banks use their discretion in fair value measurement for earnings management,
increasing coe¢ cients would be expected. However, as argued before, most banks have very low
or even zero amounts of fair value liabilities. Thus, the coe¢ cients on fair value liabilities might
not be representative or even biased. Summing up, the evidence only weakly supports H1b.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Based on the balance sheet model one would expect coe¢ cients of 1 for assets and -1 for lia-
bilities. A deviation from these expected coe¢ cients could be explained by a lack of reliability.
The results show, indeed, that all fair value assets and liabilities have coe¢ cients which are
signicantly di¤erent from the theoretically expected coe¢ cients. But the results also seem to
suggest that the investors even discount fair value assets and liabilities of the rst hierarchy
level, i.e. fair values based on quoted market prices. Hence, the observed discounts cannot
be explained only by a lack of reliability of single accounting positions. They might, though,
reect institutional characteristics of the reporting banks or country xed e¤ects which are not
considered in the valuation approach. To test for these e¤ects I split the sample rst by coun-
try groups (Table 4) and then by bank size (Table 5). For the rst split I dene two country
groups, i.e. EU 15 and Other European. The latter includes all new EU member states and
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the EFTA states. As the results of Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2011) indicate, investors place
higher discounts on fair values of banks from non-EU 15 countries. These discounts might be
explained by lower regulatory quality and less sophisticated capital markets in those countries.
The results in Table 4 show indeed that for EU 15 banks, only the coe¢ cients on level 3 fair
values deviate signicantly from expected values, while for banks from other European coun-
tries, all coe¢ cients on fair value assets and liabilities deviate from expected values. Panel B
even reveals that level 3 fair values totally lose value relevance for banks from other European
countries. Therefore, the deviation from expected values in the complete sample seems to be
driven by banks from other European countries. Another factor inuencing the results could
be institutional characteristics of the sample banks. These characteristics might be reected in
bank size (e.g. Song et al. (2010)). Therefore, I split the sample in large banks (above median
total assets) and small banks (below median total assets). The results of this partitioning are
reported in Table 5. While all fair value assets and liabilities are value relevant and coe¢ cients
do not signicantly di¤er from expected values for small banks (Panel B), they do di¤er for large
banks, and level 3 fair values even lose value relevance (Panel A). At rst glance these results are
striking. For large banks one would expect higher scrutiny by capital market participants and
an intense analyst coverage. Therefore, the reliability of recognized fair values should be higher
for large banks than for small banks. On the other hand, one could also argue that investors
can use other sources of information than nancial statements when valuing large banks, while
for small banks they have to rely on this one source of information. Accordingly, the value of
large banks could be driven by other information. This, however, should have no impact in
value relevance research as long as this information is reected in nancial statement positions.
The low coe¢ cients of large banks could therefore indicate that the additional information is a
correlated omitted variable in the regression model which casts some doubts on the valuation
approach. As discussed before, there is no convincing empirical measure for other information
and therefore a change to the Ohlson (1995) or Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model is not a
feasible solution to this problem. Another possible explanation for the low coe¢ cients for large
banks could be confounding e¤ects, i.e. the majority of large banks could be situated in other
European countries. However, the data show that EU 15 banks have on average assets worth
EUR 276.94bn, while banks from other European countries only have EUR 36.92bn. Hence, the
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low coe¢ cients of large banks cannot be explained by less sophisticated markets or a weaker
regulatory environment. Overall, the low coe¢ cient on level 1 fair value assets (FVA1 ) in the
full sample and the low coe¢ cients on fair value assets of all measurement levels in the subsam-
ples for banks from other European countries and large banks might indicate that the valuation
model is not descriptive for all banks. Therefore, the empirical results must be interpreted with
caution.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The results of the expanded empirical models (Equations 5-8) are shown in Table 6. The rst
model analyzes the e¤ect of the reclassication of nancial assets. For this purpose, the sam-
ple period is reduced to the years 2008 to 2010 because the relaxed reclassication rules went
e¤ective retroactively in July 2008. The results on the interaction terms between ReclassAssets
and the di¤erent levels of fair value assets are rather weak. The coe¢ cients on the interaction
terms do neither have the expected signs nor are they signicant. The decision to reclassify
nancial assets does not seem to be interpreted by capital market participants as a signal of
a lower accounting quality. One could argue that these results are driven by a self-selection
bias because for the year 2008, the sample includes only those banks which voluntarily disclose
fair value hierarchy data. Voluntary disclosing might indicate that these banks are committed
to a higher accounting quality. However, when the observations from 2008 are excluded from
the sample, the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms remain far from signicant at conventional
levels (untabulated). Another potential problem might be caused by the variable ReclassAs-
sets. This variable has a value of one as long as a bank has reclassied nancial assets on its
balance sheet. Yet, the actual reclassication of the nancial assets might have occurred in the
previous scal years. If investors only interpret the decision to reclassify as a signal of a lower
accounting quality, the regression results might be awed. Therefore, I replace ReclassAssets
by the variable ReclassDecision which is one if the bank has reclassied nancial assets in the
current reporting period and zero otherwise. Again, the relevant coe¢ cients are insignicant
(untabulated). Accordingly, the evidence suggests that investors do not perceive the fair value
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disclosures of reclassifying banks as less value relevant. In a further step, the variable Reclas-
sAssetsFVBV is included in the regression model. As mentioned above, this variable covers the
di¤erence between the fair value and the book value of reclassied nancial assets. Again, the
coe¢ cients of this variable and of the interaction terms remain insignicant. Summing up, the
results do not support H2a and H2b.
In the third expanded empirical model, I test for the e¤ects of regulatory capital on the perceived
reliability of fair values. Again, the sample period includes all sample years, i.e. 2006 to 2010,
but without bank-years where information about Tier 1 ratios is missing. As stated in H3, I
expect mark-to-model fair values to be less value relevant for banks with low regulatory capital
than for banks with high regulatory capital. In contrast to results for the reclassication, two
of three coe¢ cients on the interaction terms are signicant at conventional levels. The e¤ect
of regulatory capital is signicant for level 1 and level 2 fair values. While I do not make any
assumption about the impact on level 1 fair values, the results show, contrary to my predictions,
a signicantly positive e¤ect of low regulatory capital on the value relevance of level 2 fair values.
The coe¢ cient on the interaction between low regulatory capital and level 3 fair values has the
expected sign but is not signicant.6
[Insert Table 6 about here]
In a nal step, I test for both the e¤ects of reclassication and of low regulatory capital in a
combined model to control for possible confounding e¤ects. The sample for this combined model
di¤ers from the samples of the separate models because it reects the constraints of both mod-
els. The sample period spans from 2008 to 2010 and all bank-years without regulatory capital
information are excluded. The ndings are again very weak. Coe¢ cients on the interaction
terms only get signicant for level 2 fair values. Here, one can observe a positive signicant
e¤ect of low regulatory capital and of the decision to reclassify nancial assets. Even if a bank
has reclassied nancial assets and low regulatory capital, markets value its level 2 fair values
6 Goh et al. (2009) nd a signicantly negative impact of low regulatory capital on the reliability of level 3 fair
values in their study for U.S. banks.
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at a premium (11 cents for each Euro of level 2 assets) in comparison to non-reclassifying banks
with high regulatory capital.
Overall, the results of the expanded models do not seem to support hypotheses H2 and H3.
Nevertheless, one can ascertain that generalizations about mark-to-model fair values are not
feasible because market participants value level 2 and 3 fair values di¤erently. The insignicant
impact of low regulatory capital on the perceived reliability of mark-to-model fair values remains
noticeable. This result might be explained by the fact that most banks with low Tier 1 ratios
are situated in the EU 15. This means that the indicator variable LowTier1Ratio might also
cover di¤erences in value relevance between EU 15 and other European countries.
4.5 Robustness Checks
My descriptive statistics cast some doubt on the ability of the number of outstanding shares
to mitigate scale e¤ects. Therefore, I test the basic regression model with alternative deators.
Since the number of outstanding shares is rather unrelated to the economics of the sample rms,
I use two more strongly related deators, book value and market value of equity, to test for
the robustness of the regression results. Book value of equity is a very common deator in the
value relevance literature (e.g. Eccher et al. (1996), Nelson (1996)). Market value of equity, on
the other hand, is less common. This deator was proposed by Easton and Sommers (2003).
They argue that market capitalization as of scal-year end represents the scale in a sample.
Therefore, they suggest to use market capitalization as a deator. This would result in the
following regression model:
MVEit
MVEit
= 0
1
MVEit
+ 1
NFVAit
MVEit
+ 2
NFVLit
MVEit
+ 3
FVA1it
MVEit
+ 4
FVA2it
MVEit
+ 5
FVA3it
MVEit
+ 6
FVL1it
MVEit
+ 7
FVL2it
MVEit
+ 8
FVL3it
MVEit
+ 9
NIit
MVEit
+ "it: (9)
The obvious problem is that the dependent variable will take a value of one for every observation.
So an OLS estimation is no longer feasible. The authors recommend to use a WLS regression
with the inverted square of the market capitalization as a weight, which is consistent with the
regression above.
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[Insert Table 7 about here]
The results of the regressions based on these alternative deators are reported in Table 7 (BVE
in Panel A, MVE in Panel B). They reveal that the fair values of all levels remain signicant for
both alternative deators, with the notable exception of level 3 assets in the regression deated
by the book value of equity. Overall, the results still support H1a. However, the absolute values
of the coe¢ cients are substantially lower for the regression models based on the alternative
deators. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient of level 2 fair value assets is now signicantly smaller
than the coe¢ cient of level 1 fair value assets and - when using the market value of equity as
a deator - level 2 assets are no longer more value relevant than level 3 assets. This strongly
supports H1b. Rather striking is the very low adjusted R2 of the regression deated by the
book value of equity. This means that accounting measures can only explain a small part of the
cross-sectional and time-series variation of market-to-book ratios, as is well known from previous
literature (e.g. Eccher et al. (1996), Nelson (1996)).
Summing up, the results based on the alternative deators substantially deviate from the results
of the share-deated regression model. Though the basic hypotheses hold when testing the
regressions for robustness, the decreased value of the coe¢ cients in models based on book value
and market value of equity indicates that there are scale e¤ects which cannot be e¤ectively
mitigated by the number of shares.
5 Conclusion
This study is the rst which analyses the value relevance of the IFRS 7 fair value hierarchy. The
main result is that fair values of nancial instruments are value relevant, but level 3 fair values
are perceived as less reliable than other fair values. In addition, Investors price fair values of EU
15 banks substantially higher than fair values of banks from other European countries, which
can be explained by di¤erences in regulatory quality and nancial market sophistication. I also
nd that capital markets price fair values of small banks higher than fair values of large banks.
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This might indicate that market prices of large banks are more strongly driven by information
not reected in nancial statements.
The study also analyses the e¤ects of a reclassication of nancial assets and of regulatory capital
on the reliability of fair value assets. While it nds no signicant e¤ects for the reclassication,
there is a weakly signicant impact of the regulatory capital on the reliability of mark-to-model
fair values.
A limitation this study shares with all value relevance studies is that it is based on the assumption
of e¢ cient markets. This assumption might be, however, particularly questionable during the
nancial crisis. The low coe¢ cients could be explained by these extraordinary circumstances.
Overall, the results show that fair values of all measurement levels remain value relevant even
during the nancial crisis. Finally, the signicant variation of the coe¢ cients of the di¤erent fair
value levels proves that the new disclosure requirements provide decision-useful information for
investors.
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Table 1: Sample Selection
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Include all publicly traded European banks from Bankscope and Datastream: 273 273 273 273 273 1365
Exclude banks without available reports -40 -29 -25 -26 -41 -161
Exclude Non-IFRS banks -47 -46 -47 -44 -41 -225
Exclude banks not reporting on 31st December -6 -7 -7 -6 -4 -30
Exclude banks not disclosing fair value levels -175 -178 -153 -5 -2 -513
Exclude banks with missing data on market capitalization -7 -15 -22
Exclude outliers -1 -3 -2 -6
Final Sample 5 13 40 182 168 408
This table depicts the sample select ion process. First, both BvD Bankscope and T homson Reuters Datastream were used to identify all publicly
traded European (EU 27 + EFT A) banks. Then, all firm-years without readily available reports were excluded. Based on the reports all banks not
reporting on 31st December and firm-years without fair value level disclosures were eliminated. In a final step, I excluded firm-years with missing
data on market  capitalizat ion and outliers.
Tables 31
Table 2: Descripitive Statistics
Panel A: Absolute Value (in billions of Euros)
Mean Std. Dev.
25th
Percentile
50th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Obs.
(firm-years)
MVE 7.910 17.577 0.247 1.286 5.327 408
Total Assets 195.168 440.226 2.937 14.488 120.682 408
BVE 8.997 18.831 0.224 1.179 6.910 408
NFVA 113.181 229.941 1.988 9.655 92.090 408
NFVL 131.723 272.802 2.256 11.260 99.512 408
FVA1 27.557 75.259 0.196 1.606 10.142 408
FVA2 51.361 167.343 0.045 0.721 10.449 408
FVA3 3.069 10.004 0.002 0.044 0.453 408
FVL1 8.167 39.076 0.000 0.001 0.759 408
FVL2 44.485 144.779 0.005 0.339 5.442 408
FVL3 1.796 6.235 0.000 0.000 0.068 408
NI 0.533 2.858 0.008 0.062 0.362 408
Panel B: Relative Value
Mean Std. Dev.
25th
Percentile
50th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Obs.
(firm-years)
BVE / Total Assets 0.108 0.135 0.053 0.071 0.098 408
NFVA / Total Assets 0.739 0.208 0.613 0.799 0.893 408
NFVL / Total Assets 0.780 0.203 0.715 0.863 0.914 408
FVA1 / Total Assets 0.126 0.126 0.044 0.091 0.161 408
FVA2 / Total Assets 0.111 0.148 0.013 0.054 0.141 408
FVA3 / Total Assets 0.024 0.096 0.000 0.003 0.012 408
FVL1 / Total Assets 0.016 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.011 408
FVL2 / Total Assets 0.081 0.141 0.002 0.015 0.106 408
FVL3 / Total Assets 0.015 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.001 408
NI / Total Assets 0.008 0.108 0.002 0.005 0.009 408
Panel C: Value per Share
Mean Std. Dev.
25th
Percentile
50th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Obs.
(firm-years)
Share Price 18.001 26.662 3.341 8.015 21.767 408
NFVA / Number of Shares 218.791 350.402 27.362 99.247 251.042 408
NFVL / Number of Shares 248.773 410.137 29.700 102.286 298.553 408
FVA1 / Number of Shares 39.815 84.077 2.034 13.386 33.115 408
FVA2 / Number of Shares 56.618 199.090 0.766 6.526 31.135 408
FVA3 / Number of Shares 6.821 33.569 0.018 0.357 2.204 408
FVL1 / Number of Shares 7.891 42.601 0.000 0.012 2.123 408
FVL2 / Number of Shares 40.815 157.519 0.097 2.147 18.545 408
FVL3 / Number of Shares 3.253 20.828 0.000 0.000 0.096 408
NI / Number of Shares 2.054 7.622 0.108 0.570 1.733 408
This table presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample of banks from 2006 to 2010. Panel A reports
absolute values in billions of Euros, Panel B relat ive values in per cent of total assets, and Panel C values per
share. MVE (Share Price) is the market value of equity (share price) three months after fiscal year end. BVE
represents the book value of equity. NFVA (NFVL) is non-fair value assets (liabilites). FVA1 (FVL1), FVA2
(FVL2), and FVA3 (FVL3) represent fair value assets (liabilities) of the three IFRS 7 hierarchy levels. NI is net
income.
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Table 3: Value Relevance of Fair Value Assets and Liabilities
Dependent Variable: Share Price (fiscal year end + three months)
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error
t-stat
(coeff.=0) p-value
t-stat
(|coeff.|=1) p-value
Intercept 7.071 1.215 5.818 0.000
NFVA 0.561 0.146 3.845 0.000
NFVL -0.585 0.157 -3.719 0.000
FVA1 0.687 0.151 4.547 0.000 -2.068 0.039
FVA2 0.690 0.160 4.302 0.000 -1.930 0.054
FVA3 0.321 0.160 2.005 0.046 -4.237 0.000
FVL1 -0.633 0.154 -4.120 0.000 2.393 0.017
FVL2 -0.700 0.160 -4.370 0.000 1.874 0.062
FVL3 -0.390 0.168 -2.327 0.020 3.634 0.000
NI -0.065 0.076 -0.847 0.397
Adj. R² 0.484
Obs. 408
Comparison F-stat p-value
FVA1=FVA2 0.013 0.910
FVA1=FVA3 58.205 0.000
FVA2=FVA3 49.620 0.000
FVL1=FVL2 2.334 0.127
FVL1=FVL3 12.145 0.001
FVL2=FVL3 18.906 0.000
The table presents OLS coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-stats, and p-values. The comparison section tests for significant differ-
ences between the OLS coefficient estimates of fair value assets (liabilities) of different measurement levels. The sample period spans
from 2006 to 2010. NFVA (NFVL) is non-fair value assets (liabilites). FVA1 (FVL1), FVA2 (FVL2), and FVA3 (FVL3) represent fair
value assets (liabilities) of the three IFRS 7 hierarchy levels. NI is the net income. All variables are on a per share basis. The standard
errors are clustered to control for fixed effects (Petersen (2009)).
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Table 4: Value Relevance of Fair Value Assets and Liabilities: EU15 and other European Banks
Dependent Variable: Share Price (fiscal year end + three months)
Panel A: EU 15 Banks
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error
t-stat
(coeff.=0) p-value
t-stat
(|coeff.|=1) p-value
Intercept 3.315 1.003 3.304 0.001
NFVA 1.058 0.121 8.733 0.000
NFVL -1.097 0.126 -8.703 0.000
FVA1 1.082 0.112 9.697 0.000 0.737 0.462
FVA2 1.219 0.154 7.933 0.000 1.426 0.155
FVA3 0.544 0.273 1.996 0.047 -1.673 0.095
FVL1 -1.070 0.108 -9.947 0.000 -0.647 0.518
FVL2 -1.205 0.151 -7.994 0.000 -1.359 0.175
FVL3 -0.738 0.171 -4.325 0.000 1.536 0.126
NI 0.274 0.138 1.984 0.048
Adj. R² 0.760
Obs. 269
Comparison F-stat p-value
FVA1=FVA2 34.287 0.000
FVA1=FVA3 32.045 0.000
FVA2=FVA3 41.282 0.000
FVL1=FVL2 18.591 0.000
FVL1=FVL3 11.143 0.001
FVL2=FVL3 17.574 0.000
Panel B: Other European Banks
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error
t-stat
(coeff.=0) p-value
t-stat
(|coeff.|=1) p-value
Intercept 10.537 1.653 6.373 0.000
NFVA 0.275 0.079 3.458 0.001
NFVL -0.277 0.088 -3.162 0.002
FVA1 0.448 0.087 5.164 0.000 -6.352 0.000
FVA2 0.342 0.095 3.596 0.000 -6.911 0.000
FVA3 -0.005 0.133 -0.038 0.970 -7.542 0.000
FVL1 1.517 0.237 6.403 0.000 10.624 0.000
FVL2 -0.558 0.088 -6.343 0.000 5.020 0.000
FVL3 -0.048 0.120 -0.402 0.689 7.929 0.000
NI 0.113 0.101 1.118 0.266
Adj. R² 0.600
Obs. 139
Comparison F-stat p-value
FVA1=FVA2 4.327 0.039
FVA1=FVA3 27.430 0.000
FVA2=FVA3 16.062 0.000
FVL1=FVL2 65.953 0.000
FVL1=FVL3 31.985 0.000
FVL2=FVL3 17.640 0.000
This table represents the OLS regression results for two subsamples. Panel A includes all banks in EU 15 states while Panel B comprises all
other European banks, i.e. banks from new EU member states and EFTA states. The sample period spans from 2006 to 2010. NFVA
(NFVL) is non-fair value assets (liabilites). FVA1 (FVL1), FVA2 (FVL2), and FVA3 (FVL3) represent fair value assets (liabilities) of the
three different hierarchy levels. NI is the net income. All variables are on a per share basis. The standard errors are clustered to control for
fixed effects (Petersen (2009)).
Tables 34
Table 5: Value Relevance of Fair Value Assets and Liabilities: Large and Small Banks
Dependent Variable: Share Price (fiscal year end + three months)
Panel A: Large Banks
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error
t-stat
(coeff.=0) p-value
t-stat
(|coeff.|=1) p-value
Intercept 1.214 1.801 0.674 0.501
NFVA 0.534 0.191 2.804 0.006
NFVL -0.511 0.204 -2.511 0.013
FVA1 0.495 0.191 2.593 0.010 -2.643 0.009
FVA2 0.677 0.194 3.491 0.001 -1.669 0.097
FVA3 0.010 0.453 0.022 0.982 -2.187 0.030
FVL1 -0.488 0.194 -2.512 0.013 2.641 0.009
FVL2 -0.698 0.189 -3.701 0.000 1.602 0.111
FVL3 -0.072 0.382 -0.189 0.851 2.426 0.016
NI 1.609 1.076 1.495 0.136
Adj. R² 0.585
Obs. 204
Comparison F-stat p-value
FVA1=FVA2 12.831 0.000
FVA1=FVA3 5.340 0.022
FVA2=FVA3 7.973 0.005
FVL1=FVL2 10.588 0.001
FVL1=FVL3 3.527 0.062
FVL2=FVL3 6.340 0.013
Panel B: Small Banks
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error
t-stat
(coeff.=0) p-value
t-stat
(|coeff.|=1) p-value
Intercept 6.448 0.929 6.937 0.000
NFVA 0.929 0.119 7.807 0.000
NFVL -0.979 0.129 -7.574 0.000
FVA1 0.978 0.120 8.118 0.000 -0.182 0.855
FVA2 0.883 0.122 7.236 0.000 -0.962 0.337
FVA3 0.868 0.140 6.219 0.000 -0.944 0.347
FVL1 -0.673 0.309 -2.179 0.031 1.058 0.291
FVL2 -0.894 0.117 -7.650 0.000 0.903 0.368
FVL3 -0.931 0.145 -6.433 0.000 0.480 0.632
NI -0.238 0.082 -2.893 0.004
Adj. R² 0.648
Obs. 204
Comparison F-stat p-value
FVA1=FVA2 12.680 0.000
FVA1=FVA3 4.617 0.033
FVA2=FVA3 0.069 0.793
FVL1=FVL2 0.208 0.649
FVL1=FVL3 0.275 0.601
FVL2=FVL3 0.290 0.591
This table represents the OLS regression results for two subsamples partitioned by total assets. Panel A comprises large banks, i.e. banks
with total assets above median value. Panel B comprises all banks with total assets below median value. The sample period spans from
2006 to 2010. NFVA (NFVL) is non-fair value assets (liabilites). FVA1 (FVL1), FVA2 (FVL2), and FVA3 (FVL3) represent fair value
assets (liabilit ies) of the three IFRS 7 hierarchy levels. NI is the net income. All variables are on a per share basis. The standard errors are
clustered to control for fixed effects (Petersen (2009)).
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Table 7: Value Relevance of Fair Value Assets and Liabilities: Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable: Market Value of Equity (fiscal year end + three months)
Panel A: Deflator Book Value of Equity
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error
t-stat
(coeff.=0) p-value
t-stat
(|coeff.|=1) p-value
Intercept 0.641 0.119 5.394 0.000
NFVA 0.347 0.098 3.554 0.000
NFVL -0.352 0.098 -3.595 0.000
FVA1 0.469 0.090 5.214 0.000 -5.911 0.000
FVA2 0.353 0.121 2.918 0.004 -5.348 0.000
FVA3 0.061 0.077 0.789 0.430 -12.145 0.000
FVL1 -0.531 0.165 -3.213 0.001 2.841 0.005
FVL2 -0.297 0.095 -3.114 0.002 7.389 0.000
FVL3 -0.117 0.069 -1.699 0.090 12.795 0.000
NI -0.011 0.082 -0.133 0.894
Adj. R² 0.130
Obs. 408
Comparison F-stat p-value
FVA1=FVA2 15.560 0.000
FVA1=FVA3 8.911 0.003
FVA2=FVA3 4.250 0.040
FVL1=FVL2 12.102 0.001
FVL1=FVL3 7.974 0.005
FVL2=FVL3 1.981 0.160
Panel B: Deflator Market Value of Equity (WLS approach of Easton and Sommers (2003))
Coefficient
Robust
Std. Error
t-stat
(coeff.=0) p-value
t-stat
(|coeff.|=1) p-value
Intercept 0.001 0.003 0.317 0.751
NFVA 0.423 0.101 4.195 0.000
NFVL -0.435 0.105 -4.127 0.000
FVA1 0.473 0.101 4.699 0.000 -5.232 0.000
FVA2 0.394 0.124 3.175 0.002 -4.882 0.000
FVA3 0.340 0.080 4.277 0.000 -8.295 0.000
FVL1 -0.381 0.081 -4.688 0.000 7.631 0.000
FVL2 -0.389 0.128 -3.039 0.003 4.765 0.000
FVL3 -0.340 0.085 -4.010 0.000 7.789 0.000
NI -0.058 0.060 -0.971 0.332
Adj. R² 0.491
Obs. 408
Comparison F-stat p-value
FVA1=FVA2 21.040 0.000
FVA1=FVA3 19.806 0.000
FVA2=FVA3 2.588 0.108
FVL1=FVL2 0.071 0.790
FVL1=FVL3 1.032 0.310
FVL2=FVL3 2.315 0.129
This table represents the results of the robustness checks. Following the long standing debate about the appropriate deflator in market-
based accounting research I replace the number of shares outstanding by book value of equity (Panel A) and market value of equity (Panel
B). As Easton and Sommers (2003) argue, deflating by market value of equity can be done by using a WLS regression. Accordingly, Panel
A reports OLS regression results while Panel B reports WLS regression results. The sample period spans from 2006 to 2010. NFVA
(NFVL) is non-fair value assets (liabilites). FVA1 (FVL1), FVA2 (FVL2), and FVA3 (FVL3) represent fair value assets (liabilit ies) of the
three IFRS 7 hierarchy levels. NI is the net income. The standard errors are clustered to control for fixed effects (Petersen (2009)).
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